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An industrial organisation approach 
to the too-big-to-fail problem
This article suggests a reform of the organisation of money markets that would largely eliminate the risk 
of contagion. The notion of “systemically important institution” would be replaced by that of systemically 
important platform”. Such platforms would only be directly accessible to a group of “ofﬁ  cially recognised 
ﬁ  nancial institutions” that would have to comply with special regulatory requirements and would be directly 
supervised by the central bank. The status of “ofﬁ  cially recognised ﬁ  nancial institution” could be revoked by 
the central bank if these special regulatory requirements are not satisﬁ  ed. A special resolution procedure 
would be created for these institutions, so that the central bank has the legal powers to close it down, or 
at least restrict its activities before it is too late. OTC markets would still be active but, since they would 
be penalised by regulation, it is likely that they would become small, and therefore not in a position to 
jeopardise the entire system.
JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET
Professor of Banking
Swiss Finance Institute – University of Zurich and Toulouse School of Economics
NB: This paper is closely inspired of a text with the same title that was prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 54th Economic Conference, October 21-23, 2009, 
and my article “Regulating systemic institutions” published in the Finnish Economic Papers (2009), 22(2). 
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T
his article puts forward a simple reform that 
could lead to the elimination – once and for 
all – of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem, 
which is the most frightening issue currently on the 
regulatory agenda. Indeed, the main lesson that can 
be drawn from the actions taken (and statements 
made) by public authorities during this crisis is 
that, in the future, any large ﬁ  nancial institution that 
encounters ﬁ  nancial problems can expect to be bailed out 
by public authorities on the grounds that it is TBTF 
(alternative terms are too-interconnected-to-fail,1 
Large and Complex Banking Organisation – LCBO 
or Systematically Important Financial Institution – 
SIFF). The turmoil that followed the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 has indeed 
led politicians to believe they had to commit to an 
unconditional support of any troubled ﬁ  nancial 
institution whose failure might create major 
disruptions. Of course this commitment is a disaster 
in terms of moral hazard and market discipline. From 
a forward looking perspective, public authorities 
could not convey a worse message to market 
participants and bank managers. 
A similar pattern emerged after the Continental 
Illinois bail-out in 1984,2 and at the time, it took 
more than ﬁ  ve years for market discipline to be 
somewhat restored.3 But this bail-out was a single 
event, and the Comptroller of the Currency of 
the time tried to maintain, as much as he could, 
some ambiguity on which banks were really TBTF.4 
This time all ambiguity has been resolved in 
a dramatic way: all large ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
will always be rescued. Public authorities of 
G20 countries have even agreed to publicly commit 
to a systematical bail-out.  Unless resolute reforms 
are undertaken, it will probably take a very long 
time to restore market discipline again. Moreover 
an indirect outcome of the crisis was an increased 
concentration of the banking systems of many 
countries, the surviving banks becoming even bigger 
than before and in some countries at least, close to 
be too-big-to-be-bailed-out.
In a premonitory book, Stern and Feldman (2004) 
rightly identiﬁ  ed TBTF as a major regulatory issue 
and proposed a whole range of policy measures 
in order to ﬁ  x it. The reform proposed here is 
complementary to their policy recommendations, 
but I view it as a priority. It is in some way radical, 
but ﬁ  ts very well into the general movement toward 
relying more on central counterparty clearing for 
interbank trading and derivatives markets.
Another major source of concern for public authorities 
is the complete lack of resiliency of interbank and 
money markets during the recent crisis. It is amazing 
how some shocks to the relatively small subprime 
market could lead to the complete dry-up of liquidity 
markets for more than a year. This paper argues 
that this lack of resiliency is due to a fundamental 
mistake in the way these markets were conceived. 
To a large extent, the contagion that took place on 
these markets was the necessary outcome of the 
passive attitude of banking supervisors, who have 
let large banks develop an enormous and opaque 
nexus of bilateral obligations. In Rochet and Tirole 
(1996), Jean Tirole and I explored the theoretical 
justiﬁ  cations of such a decentralised organisation 
of the interbank markets and found only one 
possible answer: market discipline. More precisely 
we found that the only possible explanation why 
prudential authorities have let banks organise the 
trade of their reserves vis-à-vis the central bank in an 
over-the-counter (OTC) fashion was the desire to 
promote what we called peer monitoring i.e. the 
mutual surveillance of banks by their competitors. 
However the price to pay for this mutual surveillance 
is the risk of contagion. Market discipline only works 
if public authorities can convince market participants 
that they will not intervene if a systemic crisis occurs, 
which is obviously not credible.
A logical consequence of this result, which we did 
not defend forcefully enough in Rochet and Tirole 
(1996), is that the current, decentralised, organisation 
of interbank markets has a huge cost (contagion risk) 
1  Perhaps a more appropriate wording is too-politically-connected-to-fail.
2  In May of 1984, Continental Illinois was bailed out by the US Federal Government. It was only the 7th largest bank in the United States, but it was 
a money center bank holding large deposits of hundreds of smaller banks. US supervisors feared that its failure could propagate toward many of these smaller banks. 
The Comptroller of the Currency engineered a rescue that bailed out not only bank depositors but also uninsured creditors of the bank holding company. When 
called to testify by the Congress, the Comptroller admitted that other large banks might warrant similar support. Congressman McKinney uttered the now famous 
phrase: “Mr. Chairman, We have a new kind of bank. It is called too-big-to-fail, TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.” (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions, 1994, cited by Morgan and Stiroh, 2005).
3  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show that banks’ debt spreads only started reﬂ  ecting default risks around 1989, after a regulatory transition toward letting market 
participants share the losses when a banking ﬁ  rm fails. 
4  See Morgan and Stiroh (2005).
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but no beneﬁ  t. Market discipline does not work for 
the interbank market, not only because of the strong 
likelihood of a public bail-out in case of a crisis but 
also because of the faulty conception of its industrial 
organisation. Decentralised trading of bank reserves 
has a major drawback: it bundles liquidity risk with 
counterparty risk, which makes price discovery 
almost impossible.
The plan of the rest of this article is the following. 
Section 1 puts forward the view that public authorities 
should protect markets not banks. Section 2 presents, 
in a non technical way, the theoretical analysis 
of the choice between centralised trading and 
systemic risk.
1| PROTECTING PLATFORMS, 
  NOT BANKS
The main objective of macro-prudential regulation 
should be to protect platforms (i.e. vital parts of 
ﬁ  nancial infrastructure) not individual banks! Many 
central banks are given the rather vague objective 
of “maintaining ﬁ  nancial stability”, which gives 
them too much discretion and opens the door to 
lobbying by large institutions and political pressure. 
This could be limited if central banks were given a 
more precise mandate. The one I propose here is 
to guarantee the integrity of a precise list of ﬁ  nancial 
markets and infrastructures that are deemed “vital”: 
interbank (both secured and repo) markets, money 
markets, as well as some derivative markets and 
large value payment systems. To do so, it would 
be useful to learn from the experience of private 
clearing houses, which have developed sophisticated 
policies for protecting themselves against the failure 
of their participants. 
Many commentators have argued that the lack of 
transparency of interbank exposures on money 
markets and derivatives have played a major role 
in the propagation of the crisis. OTC transactions are 
typically very opaque and can be a major source of 
systemic risk. Secretary Geithner has fostered the 
development of central clearing platforms for credit 
derivatives.  Along the same lines, a recent paper 
by Pennachi (2009) discusses deposit insurance-
related reforms that would improve the efﬁ  ciency 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. The ﬁ  rst reform he identiﬁ  es 
is “to mitigate TBTF by reducing counterparty 
risk via centralised clearing (and possibly 
exchange-trading) of derivatives.  See also Bernanke 
(2009): “To help alleviate counterparty credit concerns, 
regulators are also encouraging the development of 
well-regulated and prudently managed central 
clearing counterparties for OTC trades. Just last week, 
we approved the application for membership in the 
Federal Reserve System of ICE Trust, a trust company 
that proposes to operate as a central counterparty and 
clearinghouse for CDS transactions.“
Bernanke (2009)  puts forward a similar proposal 
for repo markets:” Enhancing the resilience of the 
tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) market, in 
which the primary dealers and other major banks 
and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of 
secured ﬁ  nancing from money market mutual funds 
and other short-term, risk-averse sources of funding. 
For some time, market participants have been 
working to develop a contingency plan for handling 
a loss of conﬁ  dence in either of the two clearing 
banks that facilitate the settlement of tri-party 
repos. Recent experience demonstrates the need 
for additional measures to enhance the resilience 
of these markets, particularly as large borrowers 
have experienced acute stress. The Federal Reserve’s 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility, launched in the wake 
of the Bear Stearns collapse and expanded in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, has 
stabilised this critical market, and market conﬁ  dence 
has been maintained. However, this program was 
adopted under our emergency powers to address 
unusual and exigent circumstances. Therefore, 
more-permanent reforms are needed. For example, 
it may be worthwhile considering the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of a central clearing system for this market, 
given the magnitude of exposures generated and the 
vital importance of the market to both dealers and 
investors.”
My proposal would go further by extending the 
centralised model not only to derivatives and repo 
markets but also to unsecured interbank markets: 
I believe that more centralisation could be an 
efﬁ  cient way to stabilise interbank markets: for 
example, banks would be offered the choice between 
a centralised market for liquidity, which would be 
insured and supervised by the Central Bank, and 
OTC transactions that would remain risky and, 
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as such, associated with regulatory capital charges. 
As for money markets, it should be possible to move 
also toward more centralisation. As Bernanke puts it 
(2009): “In light of the importance of money market 
mutual funds – and, in particular, the crucial role they 
play in the commercial paper market, a key source of 
funding for many businesses – policymakers should 
consider how to increase the resiliency of those 
funds that are susceptible to run. One approach 
would be to impose tighter restrictions on the 
instruments in which money market mutual funds 
can invest, potentially requiring shorter maturities 
and increased liquidity. A second approach would be 
to develop a limited system of insurance for money 
market mutual funds that seek to maintain a stable 
net asset value.”
In its study on the safety and efﬁ  ciency of derivatives 
markets, the Commission of the European 
Communities (2009) states that  “CCP clearing is 
the most effective way of reducing credit risk and 
is broadly feasible in all market segments” and 
rightly points that “the near collapse of Bear Sterns 
in March 2008, the default of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008, and the bail-out of AIG on the 
next day highlighted the fact that OTC derivatives 
in general and credit derivatives in particular carry 
systemic implications for ﬁ  nancial markets. The 
three institutions mentioned above were important 
players in the OTC derivatives market, either as 
dealers or users of OTC derivatives or both.”
The guiding principle of central counterparty (CCP) 
clearing is that after two parties have agreed on a 
trade, the clearing platform steps into each trade by 
acting as counterparty to each side. This is called 
novation, a mechanism by which the platform 
essentially becomes “the buyer to every seller and 
the seller to every buyer”. This mechanism allows 
the netting of multilateral (not only bilateral) 
exposures but also the centralisation of collateral, 
which introduces diversiﬁ  cation effects, especially 
if there is some degree of cross-pledging between 
different types of markets.
To reduce the risk and possible consequences of a 
default by a clearing member or one of its customers, 
CCPs have developed several risk management 
procedures. The primary protection is provided by 
initial margin, a deposit which clearing members 
are required to place in an account with the CCP. 
CCPs typically also make margin calls to ensure 
that they remain protected over time as prices 
change. They usually also have access to additional 
default resources, such as mutual guarantee funds 
or insurance cover, and require clearing members 
to fulﬁ  ll  ﬁ   nancial requirements to reduce the 
likelihood of default. 
To protect themselves and the clearing house against 
client defaults, members are generally required to set 
a minimum level of margin for their clients according 
to rules set down by the clearing house. De facto, 
CCP failures have been extremely rare. Knott and 
Mills (2002) ﬁ  nd only three cases: Paris in 1973, 
Kuala Lumpur in 1983, and Hong Kong in 1987. 
In principle, CCPs mark-to-market positions are 
daily. Thus they should be exposed only to the extent 
that a one-day price movement exhausts the entire 
margin of a clearing member.  In practice, CCPs may 
be exposed over a longer period as it may take time 
to decide whether a member should be declared 
in default, and then to close-out positions. Several 
studies have attempted to quantify the potential 
exposure of clearing houses over one or more 
days. Some of these models are purely statistical, and 
pre-specify acceptable coverage levels in a purely 
exogenous fashion. By contrast, Fenn and Kupiec (1993) 
develop a model that aims at minimising the total 
sum of margin, settlement costs and the cost 
of settlement failure. Clearing houses need to 
trade-off several objectives when they set their 
margins. Requiring high margins and good quality 
collateral is costly to members. Marking positions 
to market and settling gains or losses, on either 
a daily or more frequent basis, also entails costs. 
To arrive at an optimal margin level the clearing 
house must balance these costs against the potential 
losses resulting from a default of contracts.
By helping to manage counterparty risk and by 
providing netting services, CCPs allows market 
participants to economise on collateral, compared 
to what they would otherwise need to hold to ensure 
equivalent protection in bilaterally cleared markets. 
Regulators also often recognise the reduction in 
counterparty risk by allowing clearing members to 
hold less capital than if they were exposed directly 
to other market participants. Clearing members 
may also reduce the resources spent on monitoring 
individual counterparties, insofar as their actual 
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counterparty is the CCP. Through the design of clearing 
members margining and collateral requirements, CCPs 
reduce the probability of immediate propagation to 
solvent members of losses incurred by the insolvent one. 
Moreover a CCP clearly improves transparency, 
which explains why reforms are often resisted by 
those currently enjoying an information advantage 
(i.e. major OTC derivatives dealers). As exempliﬁ  ed 
by the Lehman failure, when a major player in 
bilaterally cleared derivatives markets fails, it is 
not immediately apparent to the remaining market 
participants who are absorbing the losses, how big 
they are and how the failed ﬁ  rm’s counterparties 
are affected. The effects of this uncertainty can be 
devastating on market conﬁ  dence, as illustrated by 
Bear Sterns, Lehman and AIG. This uncertainty 
is mitigated by a CCP that has effective means 
of allocating losses and no incentive to use the 
information it holds for its own proﬁ  ts.  This 
neutrality alleviates the information concerns of 
market participants. A CCP also increases operational 
efﬁ  ciency, by centralising  the monitoring of trades 
and reducing potential for disputes.
CCPs have proven to be resilient even under 
stressed market conditions as the one we are facing 
today and showed their ability to ensure normal 
market functioning in case of failure of a major 
market player. A case in point is the successful 
unwinding of the interest rate swap positions left 
open following the default of Lehman Brothers. This 
was engineered by LCH.Clearnet, who operates 
SwapClear, currently the dominant provider of CCP 
clearing services for interest rate swaps. Lehman’s 
USD 10 trillion portfolio of 66,000 trades across 
ﬁ  ve currencies was replaced and less than 50% of 
Lehman Brother’s initial margins was required to 
hedge the risk, manage and auction the position.
Typically, private clearing houses distinguish 
between their members, who have a privileged 
status, and ordinary participants. In counterpart 
to their privileged status, the clearing members 
are supposed to implement a set of risk mitigation 
policies, such as collateral and capital requirements 
and bilateral credit limits. For example members 
are typically required to make an upfront deposit 
to a default fund supposed to cover losses that 
exceed the defaulting member’s margins. I believe 
central banks could adopt a similar policy, and 
condition the direct participation of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to the “vital” part of the ﬁ  nancial 
infrastructure on special requirements (such as 
solvency and liquidity requirements) that would 
go beyond the standard requirements imposed 
on deposit taking institutions by micro-prudential 
regulators. 
In effect, my proposal would aim at replacing the 
notion of “systemically important institution” by that 
of “systemically important platform.” Such platforms 
would only be directly accessible to a group of 
“ofﬁ  cially recognised ﬁ  nancial institutions” that 
would have to comply with special regulatory 
requirements and would be directly supervised by 
the central bank. The status of “ofﬁ  cially recognised 
ﬁ  nancial institution” could be revoked by the central 
bank if these special regulatory requirements are 
not satisﬁ  ed. A special resolution procedure would 
be created for these institutions, so that the central 
bank has the legal powers to close it down, or at least 
restrict its activities before it is too late. Again this 
is in line with the position recently expressed by 
Chairman Bernanke (2009): “The United States also 
needs improved tools to allow the orderly resolution 
of a systemically important nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm, 
including a mechanism to cover the costs of the 
resolution. In most cases, federal bankruptcy laws 
provide an appropriate framework for the resolution 
of nonbank ﬁ  nancial institutions. However, this 
framework does not sufﬁ  ciently protect the public’s 
strong interest in ensuring the orderly resolution of 
non-depository ﬁ  nancial institutions when a failure 
would pose substantial systemic risks. Improved 
resolution procedures for these ﬁ  rms would help 
reduce the too-big-to-fail problem by narrowing 
the range of circumstances that might be expected 
to prompt government intervention to keep the 
ﬁ  rm operating.”
These “ofﬁ  cially recognised ﬁ  nancial institutions” 
would be the equivalent of existing “systemically 
important institutions”, who have access to 
special liquidity assistance facilities and possible 
government guarantees in case of distress. But 
there would be an important difference: it is the 
central bank that would choose who belongs to the 
club and who does not! If the advantages associated 
with membership far exceeded the costs, the threat 
of revoking the status would work as an important 
disciplining device. OTC markets would still be 
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active but, since they would be penalised by 
regulation, it is likely that they would become 
small, and therefore not in a position to jeopardise 
the entire system.
2| INTERBANK LENDING
  AND SYSTEMIC RISK
In an article published in 1996, Jean Tirole and I 
analysed the trade-offs involved in the management 
of systemic risk on interbank markets. This section 
summarises, in a non-technical fashion, the main 
conclusions of our analysis, which already contained 
the main elements of what I call today the “Industrial 
organisation approach” to the TBTF problem.
A ﬁ  rst, important, remark is that systemic risk is 
a concern only in a decentralised environment 
in which banks incur credit risk in their mutual 
transactions. Like in many crises of the past, 
governments have tried to resolve the current crisis 
(ex post) by insuring most of interbank claims, rescuing 
distressed banks through discount loans, the facilitation 
of purchase-and-assumptions, nationalisations, and 
so forth. However, such policies do not provide proper 
(ex ante) incentives for interbank monitoring and 
may lead to substantial cross-subsidies from healthy 
banks to frail ones through a government-mediated 
mechanism. An alternative method of prevention 
of systemic risk would consist in centralising banks’ 
liquidity management. The Fed funds market could be 
organised as an anonymous double auction (to which 
the central bank could participate to manage global 
liquidity), in which each bank would trade with the 
central bank rather than with other banks. The central 
bank would then have better control over interbank 
positions and would further prevent systemic risk 
on the interbank market. Last, bank transactions 
on derivative markets could be protected through 
sufﬁ  cient collateral so that, again, banks would not 
grant each other credit. Whether the government 
is affected by a bank failure in a centralised system 
depends on the constraints it puts on banks, but, in 
any case, centralisation, like insurance, eliminates 
systemic risk.
The current system of interbank linkages suffers 
from its hybrid nature. On one hand, banks engage 
in largely decentralised mutual lending. On the 
other hand, government intervention, voluntary 
or involuntary, destroys the very beneﬁ  t  of 
a decentralised system, namely, peer monitoring 
among banks. If one does not believe that the social 
value of the ﬁ  ne information that banks have or 
may acquire about each other exceeds the cost of 
systemic risk, then there is no particular reason to 
encourage decentralised interactions among banks. 
To stress the point that a decentralised operation 
of interbank lending must be motivated by peer 
monitoring, consider the following (alternative) 
plausible explanation of interbank lending. Some 
banks, perhaps due to their regional implantation, 
are good at collecting deposits, but have poor 
investment opportunities. In contrast, some other 
banks, such as the money center banks, have plenty 
of such opportunities or else are sufﬁ  ciently large to 
afford the large ﬁ  xed costs associated with complex 
derivative and other high-tech ﬁ  nancial markets. It 
then seems natural for the former banks to lend to 
the latter. Yet, that a deposit-collecting bank should 
incur a loss when the borrowing bank defaults, as 
is implied by interbank lending, is not a foregone 
conclusion. If the relationship between the two banks 
involves a transfer of funds but no monitoring, the 
operation described above could be implemented in 
a more centralised, and probably better for prudential 
control, way. Namely, the deposit-collecting bank 
could pass the deposits on to the borrowing bank, 
while continuing to service them (in the same way 
a bank may continue to service mortgage loans it has 
securitised without recourse to other banks). The 
key difference with the interbank-loan institution 
is that the deposits made at the originating bank 
would, except to the eyes of the depositors, become 
deposits of the receiving bank. So, if the latter 
defaulted, losses would be borne by the deposit 
insurance fund, and not by the originating bank. 
We conclude that a mere specialisation of banks into 
deposit-taking banks and actively investing banks by 
itself does not lead to the existence of decentralised 
interbank lending.
One of the key messages conveyed by Rochet 
and Tirole (1996) is that the ﬂ  exibility afforded by 
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decentralised interbank transactions can only be 
justiﬁ  ed by banking regulators’ desire to promote 
effective peer monitoring by banks. However the 
current crisis has shown that the cost of encouraging 
this peer monitoring, namely allowing the possibility 
of a systemic crisis was far bigger than the potential 
beneﬁ  t of this peer monitoring, especially given the 
impossibility for public authorities not to bailout   
large insolvent institutions. Therefore  centralising 
the payment system, the Fed funds market, and 
other markets in which banks currently have 
bilateral exposures would result in an equally 
efﬁ  cient allocation of liquidity among banks and 
would facilitate prudential control.
Confronted with an unprecedented freezing of interbank and monetary markets after September 2008, 
central banks have reacted by assuming a large part of the intermediation of liquidity ﬂ  ows among banks, 
and de facto becoming the clearing houses for the unsecured and for the collateralised interbank markets. 
A natural question is when this “temporary” situation will cease and when interbank markets will “go back 
to normal”. 
Similarly, governments have felt obliged to set up extremely wide bailout packages including public 
recapitalisations, purchase of toxic assets, and subsidised lending to distressed institutions. When is 
this “exceptional” situation supposed to terminate and what policies are supposed to be implemented, 
in the future, for dealing with TBTF institutions?
The response to these questions that is put forward in this paper may seem radical, but it is reasonably 
simple. The main idea is to reverse the balance of power between large banks and supervisors. Instead 
of letting some banks grow big and opaque enough to constitute a threat to the ﬁ  nancial system, my 
proposal is to let the central bank, as the systemic risk supervisor, decide which banks are safe enough 
to be allowed as members of the ﬁ  nancial “platforms” that are deemed vital for the economy: large 
value payment systems, unsecured and collateralised interbank markets and some derivative markets.  
The central bank would receive an explicit mandate for guaranteeing the continuity of these platforms 
and for regulating membership.
If the advantages associated with membership to these platforms far exceeded the costs, the threat of 
revoking the member status would work as an important disciplining device. OTC markets would still be 
active but, since they would be penalised by regulation, it is likely that they would become small, and 
therefore not in a position to jeopardise the entire system.
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